Fraud Runs as a Network. Why Don't the Defenders? | Dave Bergeron
Guest: Dave Bergeron, Financial Crimes Executive in BSA/AML and Fraud Prevention, CAMS and CFE
Dave Bergeron is a financial crimes executive working in BSA/AML and fraud prevention, a Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist and a Certified Fraud Examiner. He began his career in the US military and intelligence community and his current research is on elder financial exploitation. He appears in a personal capacity and the views here are his own. His argument is one sentence long: it takes a network to defeat a network. Fraud is now run by decentralised actors operating offshore, split across groups that make the calls, open the accounts and move the money, while the people defending against it still mostly work one institution at a time.
What does the war against Al-Qaeda have to do with fraud?
It is the precedent he reaches for, and he names his source: retired General Stanley McChrystal's book My Share of the Task, and the section on Iraq. His reading is that US and allied forces found themselves facing an organised network operating at speed, and concluded they had to build a network of their own to keep pace.
What that took was pulling down barriers that existed for good reasons. In US law the military operated under Title 10, law enforcement under Title 18 and the intelligence community under Title 50, and overseas those divisions were getting in the way. Fusion centers and joint intelligence task forces put analysts from different agencies in one room, sitting beside the special operations forces running the raids, so what came back off one raid was processed in real time and turned into the next target.
He maps the same shape onto financial crime, and attaches the same societal caveats. Privacy, data sharing, intellectual property and competition between institutions are the financial equivalent of those statutory barriers, and he says the community has to work out what it is comfortable with rather than assume the answer.
The cautionary half is the part that is easy to skip. Suppressing a network is not eradicating it. Without governance, security and law enforcement making a region genuinely non permissive, the actors move somewhere weaker and carry on.
How does fraud actually work as a supply chain?
He sketches it end to end, and points at a document rather than only his own experience: the Financial Action Task Force published a paper on 5 November laying out how these networks operate and what to do about them. He is careful to say he had not yet read it closely, and suggested linking it with the episode.
The shape he describes starts with actors overseas making the calls, to banks or to consumer lending companies. Mules inside the country open the bank accounts or turn up to loan closings and signings, presenting false credentials. Whether those mules know what they are part of he does not claim to know: they may be paid, they may be exploited. The funds land in an account the fraud actor controls, are wired overseas almost immediately, and are laundered onward from there.
The consequence for a bank is the whole problem in miniature. An institution working in its own silo only ever sees the fraud it detects itself. A good one takes the signals from a confirmed fraudulent transaction and builds a block list, so the same signals are stopped next time. None of that prevents the same false credentials being walked into 19 or 20 other institutions.
So what he wants is fraud signals flowing into a central repository that institutions can both feed and query. Some of this exists already in disparate places, through vendors aggregating consortium data and through public-private partnership work, but nothing yet that every institution can send signals to and pull block lists from.
Why is Section 314(b) used so unevenly?
Because for years it meant sending an email and hoping. That is his own experience from 14 years ago: the team would investigate, notify another institution when they saw a transaction go there, and sometimes get a reply and sometimes not.
What he thinks changes the picture is FinCEN's recent guidance, which the host summarised as confirming that fraud is in scope. If aggregating fraud signals falls under the safe harbour, that is the opening for shared block lists rather than one off notifications.
The reason he expects goodwill is that the competitive instinct does not apply here. Institutions compete, and should, for innovation and pricing. Financial crimes teams across those institutions are looking at the same risk and the same actor moving from bank one to bank two to bank three, and he says plainly that he would welcome the ability to share what he sees.
What would a regional fusion center do that a phone call cannot?
Remove the queue. His proposal, which he believes the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act contemplated, is regional centers where FinCEN staff, law enforcement and bank investigators sit together and act as a point of contact for investigators around the country.
He is not guessing about the mechanism. When specialists sit in one room they are not routing requests through chains of communication, because the authority to talk to each other has already been given. Anything landing on one person's desk becomes a priority for the others. Contact law enforcement from outside and you join a queue behind their own priorities, and they have more work than they can manage.
Asked whether Utah's financial crime coordination centers are that idea, he says they are the early version of it and is openly watching rather than endorsing. It is a small cell, limited for now to government employees, with Texas having stood one up as well. What would make the case is evidence: whether they can show they are disrupting fraud and size the effect. If that holds, he hopes other states follow.
What is missing from hold authority laws?
The other half of the equation. He welcomes the state laws letting a bank hold a transaction when a red flag is present, and says a hold on its own is not finished policy.
His worked example is a state where a hold runs for 30 days, can be extended, and extended again, reaching somewhere in the region of 50 to 80 days. He is careful to say he is going from memory of one state. The point survives the detail: holds generate false positives, and a false positive is a legitimate person locked out of their own money.
What he wants beside the hold is an obligation to act. A remediation timeline, or oversight asking whether anything is being done to resolve the hold, whether that is the institution's own investigation or a referral to Adult Protective Services. Without it, he can see a hold quietly slipping down a list of competing priorities while a customer waits.
What does a win look like if eradication is off the table?
Friction, measured. Imagine a national block list, he says: instead of walking compromised credentials into 20 institutions, the actor finds them dead by the third or fourth, and has to build new phones, new email addresses and new accounts to continue.
That is the win he will claim. The operation slows down, it costs more to run, and fewer fraudulent losses are realised. He expects other countries to be able to track the same thing, and sees the information sharing and public-private partnership work the host raised in the UK, Europe and Singapore as the same direction of travel. The other half, going after where the scam centres physically operate, is what he points to the FATF paper for.
What does an obituary hand a scammer?
A target package, in the military sense, and he is visibly uncomfortable saying it. An obituary is a celebration of a life. To a fraud actor it identifies an emotionally vulnerable widow or family, with a name, probably an address, a geographic location, where the services are being held and the history of the person who died.
He checked one the day before the conversation to see whether it still held true, and it did. All of it builds a profile and an approach, ready for whenever the target responds to a first message.
What should change after a customer dies?
Something, and he is explicit that the shape of it is a public question rather than a settled answer. Institutions already follow the regulatory requirements that apply when a person is recorded as deceased. What he raises is whether, as a society, we are comfortable with an institution flagging a related family account to pay closer attention for unusual transactions, and he leaves the privacy question open rather than answering it for everyone.
For families the advice is lighter and starts this week. Watch for communication with a new person nobody has heard of, often someone who has arrived aligned with a faith, an interest or a hobby. Then ask small questions: who is this, how did you meet them, what do they do. If something is off, follow with the specific ones: are they asking you for money, what for, how are they asking you to send it. He is firm that this is done while respecting the person's dignity and independence.
Asked how common this is, he estimates elder exploitation may be around 30 percent of all fraud by proxy, and flags the number as his own impression, saying others may agree or disagree. He adds the reason he works on it: he will be elderly himself in 20 or 30 years.
Where does AI help, and where does it fall short?
The help he describes is monitoring, and it is specific. Watching for new lines of credit opened outside the normal pattern, which he says statistical models or machine learning can do. Watching the burn rate on an older person's account: historical debits and credits, transaction types, ACH and cheques, and then the shift to cash. An account that was solvent for five years that will now empty in three, or in one, is a question worth asking.
The detail he offers is the one a model can act on. Cash withdrawals of $9,000 sit just under the $10,000 currency transaction report threshold in the US, and that pattern should put a person in the institution in front of the customer.
Where he stops is interesting, because the limits he names are not technical. Several states now let an older customer nominate someone to be contacted if something looks wrong. Whether a bank that has known a family for 15 or 20 years should be able to call a son or daughter without that authorisation is, again, the privacy question he keeps returning to, and he says he hopes the conversation is happening.
What would Dave Bergeron change in the next year?
Three things, and they are the episode in order. A federal block list, bringing consortium data and fraud signals together where institutions can use them. A stronger 314(b) process, with financial crimes investigators sitting beside law enforcement analysts. And deliberate work between victims, Adult Protective Services, law enforcement and behavioural health experts towards federal legislation covering transaction holds and nominated contacts, so the protections are the same in every state. He notes one law on romance scams was recently signed, while many other bills have been introduced in Congress and stalled.
Takeaways
- The argument in one line: it takes a network to defeat a network, and the attackers built theirs first.
- Fusion centers worked against Al-Qaeda because analysts and operators sat together, not because anyone wrote a better policy.
- Suppressing a network is not eradicating it. Weak governance somewhere else is where it reappears.
- A bank in a silo only sees the fraud it catches itself, while the same stolen credentials are walked into 19 or 20 other institutions.
- Section 314(b) has existed since the Patriot Act and was used as email and hope. Safe harbour for aggregated fraud signals is what would change that.
- Competition between banks is not the obstacle. Their financial crimes teams are already looking at the same actor.
- Utah and Texas have stood up state coordination centers. They are small, government only, and worth watching rather than copying yet.
- Hold authority without a remediation timeline leaves legitimate customers locked out of their own money for weeks.
- A realistic win is friction: credentials dead by the third institution rather than the twentieth, so the operation runs slower and costs more.
- An obituary gives a fraud actor a name, an address, a location and a history, and an emotionally vulnerable person to approach.
- The family version of defence is four questions about the new friend nobody has met, asked without taking away the person's independence.
- AI is good at the burn rate and the outlier, including cash withdrawals pitched just under the $10,000 reporting threshold. The unresolved part is privacy, not modelling.
Transcript
Alex: Fraud used to be one criminal and one victim. Now it runs like a supply chain. One group runs the scam, another launders the money, another rents out the accounts. The people defending against it are still mostly working alone.
Dave: When you think about the financial crimes teams and the investigators, regardless of what institution you're working at, everyone's on the same page. Because an obituary is something that should be cherished. It's a celebration of life.
Alex: Yeah.
Dave: But they're seeing it as, to use the context of a Military and intelligence world, it's a target package for them. Just because you suppress a network doesn't mean it's gone. You don't eradicate it.
Alex: Hi, I'm Alex, and this is Curiosity Code podcast. My guest today works in financial crime risk management, and he is certified anti-money laundering specialist and certified fraud examiner. He began his career in the U.S. military and intelligence community, and he now researches elder financial exploitation. Dave Bergeron's argument is that it takes a network to defeat a network.
Alex: So we will, talk about what connected defense looks like, from banks sharing information to states building coordination centers, then, the smaller, more personal version of the same problem— scammers who read obituaries and go after the surviving spouse. Dave, welcome to the show.
Dave: Thanks, Alex. Happy to be here.
Alex: All right, let's dive into it. So your argument is that it takes a network to defeat a network. You stated you started out in the military and the intelligence community. Without any specifics, what did that work teach you about how connected adversary actually gets beaten?
Dave: Yeah, absolutely. And, you know, the fraud as a service network today is just so prolific and they're decentralized actors. And I don't think there's anyone who isn't getting these scam texts on a phone and things like that. They're operating from offshores. It's a global network and it's frustrating and causing a lot of harm and damage to people all over the world.
Dave: And so this, when I think about the challenge, I usually like to pull a page from history. And so the war on terror, specifically the war against Al-Qaeda, is something that really resonates strongly with me of how the US and the global community confronted that problem set. And one thing I would point to as a, a reference is retired General Stanley McChrystal's book, My Share of the Task, specifically the section in the book where he talks about Iraq. When 9/11 happened and US forces started to confront Al-Qaeda, it became very clear in the first couple of years, especially after the Iraq invasion, that this was an organized network operating at a very fast pace. And US forces and global partners, international partners who were involved in that conflict, quickly learned that we have to build a network to keep pace with that one.
Dave: And so over time, once that network was established, And it really involved breaking down a lot of barriers. Here in the United States, we have the US Code. Back at that time in our history, we had different authorities for different organizations. So the military was Title 10, law enforcement was Title 18, intelligence community was Title 50. Those barriers exist for a reason, but overseas they were getting in the way of us operating effectively in order to suppress that network.
Dave: And so McChrystal talks about how fusion centers were created, Joint Intelligence Task Force, and basically they started bringing intelligence analysts from different agencies together. Not only that, sitting side by side the special operations forces who were going out and conducting the raids. And so when information and intelligence came back from those raids, it could be processed in real time, new targets could be identified, those forces could go back out. And once that network was up and running, we were able to keep pace with Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. And then really we were able to start putting pressure on that network, degrading it, reducing its capability and efficiency, and really through a lot of attrition, weakening it from a leadership perspective.
Dave: So that's kind of the same frame I'm seeing what we're dealing with with these fraud actors today. We need to build a unified network, and this isn't just a US problem. Every country needs to tackle this and solve this. And so there's a lot of challenges and barriers that need to be overcome because a lot of societal questions are going to come up. Drawing back to how I said we have those codes and authorities for a reason.
Dave: Same thing in financial services, privacy issues, data sharing, intellectual property competition, things like that. There's, there's a lot of, of discussion we need to have amongst the community to see what are we comfortable with. There's also— oh, I'm sorry, Alex. There's another cautionary tale here as well. Just because you suppress a network doesn't mean it's gone.
Dave: You don't eradicate it. You can reduce its ability to keep conducting its operations, but you still need governance and security in whatever geographic region you're in to fully make it a non-permissive environment for that network to operate. So even if we get to a place where we can build the network to defeat the network, these actors are going to look for other regions in the world where there's weak governance and security and law enforcement to set up their operations and keep doing what they're doing.
Alex: Right. And I think it's, beyond, the network definition is how this network actually operates, because you describe modern fraud as a supply chain, which is interesting. It's like one group runs the scam, another launders the money, another rents out the accounts. Can you, walk us through how that division of labor works and what it means for a bank that only ever sees one piece of it?
Dave: Yeah, absolutely. And it's really— this is a timely discussion. The Financial Action Task Force just put out a paper on this on November 5th, where they're basically laying out how these, these networks operate end to end, the whole supply chain. And they even offer, recommendations on how to combat it. I haven't really had a chance to dive deeply into it, but maybe that's a link we could put as a part of this show.
Dave: But yeah, absolutely. Maybe at a very high level, You have actors overseas who are making the phone calls, contacting banks or contacting consumer lending companies or trying to commit fraud. You have mules within a country that are opening bank accounts or going to loan closings or signings or things like that. And it is very much kind of a disparate network, so to speak, For example, the mules, we, we don't know, not 100% sure if they know what they're getting into. Maybe they're being offered money to just go here.
Dave: They're being provided false credentials to present themselves as somebody else. And maybe they're being, maybe they're being exploited or maybe they're being compensated. It's hard to say. But anyway, they're going to be involved in the transaction. So the initial contact comes from overseas and a mule is used locally.
Dave: Then the funds are dispersed to a bank account controlled by the fraud actor, and then those funds are immediately wired overseas, and then the money's gone at that point, and then probably laundered through other accounts and things like that, and ultimately will make its way back into the hands of those networks back overseas. And to your second question too, what— how does a financial institution deal with this? Well, if, if an institution is just operating in its own silo and it's not taking advantage of the 314(b) program or maybe doesn't have strong relationships, with law enforcement. Because here in the United States, FinCEN does— that's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, which is the proponent for where all suspicious activity reporting is filed in the US. They do offer some public-private partnership.
Dave: There are meetings that occur on a weekly basis where you can have agents and, bank personnel kind of discuss kind of the key suspicious activity that's, that's been reported. But really what this all speaks to is you're limited to the fraud that you're detecting within your own institution. And so hopefully an institution is taking that data when they confirm that a transaction's fraudulent. They're taking the signals from that, they're building a block list, so if they ever see those signals again, they can immediately identify a red flag and, and stop a future transaction from happening. But that doesn't stop when a fraud actor is going to take those false credentials and then go to 19 20 other institutions and use it and try to open an account or get a loan or something to that effect.
Dave: So really what this takes is all those fraud signals need to start flowing into a central repository that institutions can tap into. And I think to some degree that is occurring, just in disparate places. So maybe through vendors, consortium data is being established where anyone who signs up with a vendor those fraud signals are, are being aggregated together. There may be other consortium work going on, between, again, public-private partnership financial institutions and law enforcement. So I think these efforts are starting to emerge, but still they're not fully integrated centrally where all financial institutions would be able to send fraud signals to and also tap into those block lists and identify potential fraudulent actors.
Alex: Right. And I'd like to talk more about it. So, as you said, Section 314(b) has let US banks share information with each other since the Patriot Act. And FinCEN's June guidance confirmed fraud is in scope. So, like, legal path exists.
Alex: Why it's used so unevenly? And it seems like, you know, the criminals coordinated so well, and we're still kind of defending against them and mostly working alone, not as a network, as you said at the beginning of the show.
Dave: Yeah, it's really interesting. I read that FinCEN release, and I do, to your point, feel like that's going to open the door now to say this goes beyond just sending an email to another institution. And that's really what I experienced 14 years ago with 314(b). Our team would conduct an investigation. We would notify another financial institution when we saw a transaction go there.
Dave: Maybe we would get a response from them, maybe we wouldn't. I think there are solutions out there that are trying to enhance and make that communication more efficient. But really, if FinCEN is saying now that aggregation of, of data, fraud signals, things like that can fall under the safe harbor, I think that's a huge opportunity now to, to start sharing those block lists and have more free flow of communication. Because when you, when you think about it just for a second and you look at it from a very high level, financial institutions ultimately are in competition with one another, and we want that. We want a free marketplace for innovation and better pricing and things like that.
Dave: But when you think about the financial crimes teams and the investigators, regardless of what institution you're working at, everyone's on the same page. Everyone's seeing things the same way. And generally, I would assume that they're all understanding the nature of this fraud risk that's out there, where an actor's going to go from institution 1 to 2 to 3 to 4. And speaking for myself, I would love it if I had that ability to just share the information with the other institutions when I see flow of funds moving across them. And so if we can get the data sharing in place, I think that's a huge thing, again, fraud signals and block lists.
Dave: The other thing is, and I believe the National Defense Authorization Act in 2020 contemplated this, and then maybe this is a crazy idea, be interested to see if there's any comments when this video posts, but if we could set up regional fusion centers where you have FinCEN law enforcement folks and you have financial institution investigators all sitting next to each other in a room that could be like a regional point of contact for investigators at banks around the country to maybe enhance that communication. You have someone who's going to pick up the phone, hear what you have to say, start making those connections. And then maybe now we're building those nodes within the United States of more free flow of communication. And we're actually standing up that network not only from a data sharing perspective, but also from an investigative perspective.
Alex: Isn't that what Utah is trying to do with their financial crime coordination centers that opened this year?
Dave: And, and that was— I was really excited to see that article. And it's right now it's just limited to, government employees. So I think it's state prosecutor, maybe law enforcement and some other folks. It's a small cell right now, but I think it's going to be really interesting to see if that proves out and what kind of efficacy and data they share in terms of effectiveness. I know
Alex: It was kind of a pilot, pilot program in a way, right?
Dave: Yeah, absolutely. And I know Texas has it as well. They stood one up. So these are kind of the initial use cases. And if there's, there's validity here and there's value and they're actually able to say through these efforts we are really disrupting just any fraud activity and are able to size it, hopefully other states create these as well and we really start to, to build that layer of defense.
Alex: What's, center like that do that a bank or a police department talking on the phone can't?
Dave: It kind of goes back to, again, this taking another page from the war against Al-Qaeda and things like that. When you have all these specialists sitting in a room together, you aren't limited to— excuse the term— but bureaucratic protocols going through certain chains of communication and things having to move from one office to the other. When you have those folks right next to each other, things move very quickly because you've already been given authorization to kind of knock down those barriers of, of communication. Anything that hits one person's hand in that cell is going to be a priority for the others. And so they'll all effectively work together and collaborate on, on a specific issue.
Dave: And if they're all looking at fraud risk kind of at that same point in time, then I think there's going to be more effectiveness as opposed to If you, you, you're a financial institution contacting law enforcement, you're gonna have to go through those processes and it's gonna take more time. And then, you know, law enforcement, is also— they have their priorities and they ostensibly have more work than they can manage. So when you create a cell that's specifically focused on one problem set, I think you get a lot more efficiency out of it.
Alex: Dave, earlier this year you wrote that a hold authority law buys time on a transaction. Let's talk about it. So once a bank has held the money, what has to exist next and whose job is it?
Dave: Yeah, and really happy to see these, these regulations starting to push out across the states here in the United States. And I think it's a, it's an effective tool, especially when a red flag is present. But I think it's only one side of the equation right now. For example, I looked at one of the states, I believe it's— you can put a hold in place for X number of days, 30 days, but then you can extend it, and then you can extend it again. And I think the sum of the hold goes out 50 to 80 days, which is fine, but through this process, you're going to have false positives.
Dave: You're going to have legitimate individuals who are unable to access their funds while this hold is in place. And so I think another thing that needs to be reconciled with this is if you're going to put a hold in place, there has to be some sort of remediation timeline put in there as well, or some sort of oversight on are actions being taken to effectively resolve the hold and remove it, or identify it as a true positive and take the appropriate steps there. So whether that is an institution conducting their own fraud investigation, reaching out to Adult Protective Services, especially in the context of elder financial exploitation, there has to be something there driving action Because you don't want otherwise competing priorities, a hold's put in place. I could see it being very easy for an organization to maybe just lose sight of that. And now you're impacting a consumer who's, again, it's not a fraudulent transaction, and now they're waiting longer than they need to to get access to their funds.
Dave: So I think it's another conversation we need to have.
Alex: I'm trying to understand, you know, what the end goal is for all of this? So if we look at global cases, so UK has JMLIT, Europe has EFIPPP, and there is COSMIC in Singapore. And one of the points that you published so far is mostly about process, not proof that fraud actually went down. So if eradication is off the table, what does a win actually look like and how would you measure it?
Dave: Yeah, I think we— you could look at it tangibly through— because we're talking about fraud as a supply chain, so disruption to that, what does that look like? One, you start slowing them down. Let's say conceptually there was in the United States a natural— a national federal block list. So instead of that actor being able to take compromised credentials to 20 financial institutions, now by the time they get to the 3rd or 4th, every other— those credentials are no longer effective. So now they're going to have to create new phone, email, new bank accounts, and make new attempts.
Dave: So it's going to slow them down, and then it's going to make their operations more expensive as well. And so I think that's the, that's the win on those who are being targeted by the fraud actors, is we're slowing them down, it's costing them more money, and we're reducing the amount of fraud that will also— should ultimately play out in fraudulent losses being realized within the United States. And I think other countries could track this as well. And then the organizations you mentioned, exactly the same thing going on— the information sharing, the public-private partnership and collaborations. Like, those other countries are— we're all trying to move in the same direction there.
Dave: And if we can do that, we can, on the prevention side, be more effective. And then it comes down to, again, what FATF just published in their document, how do you actually go after where these centers are operating from and start to reduce their capability and their ability to operate as really as effectively as they are in a particular geographic region?
Alex: I'd like to talk on the smallest version. I know this is a big problem. What does an obituary hand a scammer?
Dave: Oh gosh, it just— it's, it's so morally, just the depravity of, of where these, these actors are going to, that, that they would— because an obituary is something that should be cherished. It's a celebration of life.
Alex: Yeah,
Dave: But they're seeing it as, to use the context of a military and intelligence world, it's a target package for them. It is— you have identification of an emotionally vulnerable widow whose spouse has just passed away, an emotionally vulnerable family. So you have names, you have probably an address. Maybe I looked at an obituary yesterday just to get some high-level, data for this conversation, and it all still holds true. You get a geographic location.
Dave: Where were the services? Where can you send a kind note? You get history about the individual who passed away. And all that information and data can be used for a fraud actor to further build out a profile of a potential target and develop an approach of how they're going to engage with that person if the person bites or engages on the initial outreach or communication.
Alex: So in practical terms, I want to build more on that for people who are building and run financial products. So A bank learns a customer has died. What should change on their surviving spouse accounts in the weeks that follow?
Dave: Yeah, so there are some regulatory requirements around that when a person is listed as deceased, and so financial institutions will follow those rules. But the other thing is, this might be, again, another societal conversation on are we comfortable from a privacy perspective of maybe an institution if, if they know family members, should something on an account flag and just say, pay a little extra attention here, you know, be on the lookout for unusual transactions that may start occurring that could be potentially— and here's what those could look like. And I can— we can walk through maybe a couple of examples of that, because really, that's— I think we owe it to ourselves, as with our friends and neighbors, is when, when there is a loss Family members should be checking in on each other more frequently, and then institutions should, should be as well, because we want to try to identify those red flags if they start to emerge.
Alex: Yeah, that's what I'm trying to understand again from the practical point of view. So families and neighbors, what should they watch for in the first weeks after a loss and what can someone do this week?
Dave: They should be just looking out for, and without getting into the psychological side of it, but really maybe just any indicators of communication with a new person that nobody's ever heard of before. And maybe, and looking for, it could be a very subtle, again, the fraud actor is going to look for a specific approach, somebody coming in and aligning with their faith or an interest or a hobby or something like that. And then maybe just asking questions, oh, who is this? How did you meet them? And just ask those high-level questions.
Dave: Obviously, you want to respect the elder person's dignity and independence, but just kind of subtly understanding, oh, you have a friend. Who is it? What do they do? How did they reach out to you? How did you meet them?
Dave: And I think just those simple questions might kind of spin the gears of, okay, something's not right here. And then asking the follow-up questions if there's a concern. Are they asking you for money? What do they need the money for? How are they asking you to send money to them?
Dave: And I think those, if you can get those baseline answers, that will definitely generate some red flags and prompt some additional conversations of maybe additional intervention is needed here.
Alex: From your experience, how common is this fraud?
Dave: Elder exploitation? I mean, it is. I definitely say it's probably one of the predominant fraud types by proxy. I don't know, maybe— I'm sure others may agree or disagree. I'd say maybe 30% of all fraud because this is a vulnerable population and I'm going to be elderly in 20 to 30 years as well.
Dave: And if my mental cognition starts to decrease and, you know, I could be more susceptible to the scams that are, that are being run.
Alex: Where does AI generally help in fraud defense, and where does it fall short?
Dave: Yeah, I think this is especially— and my goodness, from the time we first talked a few weeks ago to where we are today, now agents are already starting to roll out. I think AI presents some opportunities here on just keeping an eye on a vulnerable person's financial accounts. So one, probably looking for are new lines of credit being opened that are kind of outside the normal. I mean, you could probably build that through statistical models, machine learning, and things like that. But transaction monitoring, I'd say looking at a burn rate for an elderly person's account, you should be better at hopefully helping financial institutions identify outlier transactional activity.
Dave: So looking at historical debits and credits, transaction types, ACHs and checks, and then all of a sudden Okay, starting to see some more cash withdrawals in this account. Maybe was going to be solvent for 5 years. All of a sudden now this account's going to go zero out in 3 years or 1 year. What's driving this accelerated withdrawal activity and why is it cash? And then you could even overlay it with the CTR reporting threshold in the United States of $10,000.
Dave: Why are we seeing withdrawals of $9,000 in cash? And again, prompting a red flag for someone in the institution to have a conversation with that customer Or, and this is where regulation, state regulations in the United States are now making it available where an elderly person can say, if you see something, I want you to contact this person, could be a family member, whoever they, they name. So that is starting to pop up around the different states in the legislatures. And then the other question that's coming up too is, again, as a society, Do we take that one step further? Should a financial institution, if they know the family and they've been banking with the family for 15 or 20 years, be able to contact the son or daughter of an elderly person and say something doesn't look right, even if the elderly person didn't authorize that?
Dave: But again, that's a big public policy privacy. What are we as individuals comfortable with? And I hope those conversations are going on.
Alex: I agree. Dave, I'd like to wrap it up with my final question. If you could make one thing happen in the next year so that the defenders work more like a network, what would it be?
Dave: So I think, yeah, 2 things there. Well, probably 3 things, Alex. Like we talked about, would love to see a federal block list be created. Bring all the consortium data together, the fraud signals as they're being identified, and allow financial institutions to tap into that. Would love to see it if we could really enhance the 314(b) process and get financial crimes investigators sitting next to law enforcement analysts and others.
Dave: And I'd really love to see— I'd like to see some more deliberate discussion amongst victims, Adult Protective Services, law enforcement, other behavioral health experts and really start to put together legislation that can be signed into law at a federal level for all the things we've talked about, the transaction holds, the contacting a named person. I know we've had one piece of legislation get signed into law here recently around romance scams. There's been so many other bills that have been presented in Congress and just haven't moved all the way through. But I'd really like to see some of these things start to move to a federal level so we implement these across all states.
Alex: Dave, thank you very much for this conversation. I enjoyed it a lot. I learned a lot about fraud defense, and I hope that things that you just said will actually come to life soon, and we'll have a better system, more resilient system, and system that can protect us from growing possibilities of fraud-related networks.
Dave: I appreciate it, Alex. Thanks for having me today.
Alex: Thanks again. And for the listeners, thanks for listening till the very end. And don't forget to hit the like button on YouTube, subscribe to the channel, and, leave your feedback at podcast platform you may be listening this to. And see you in the next episode. Bye-bye.